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TOILING IN FACTORY AND ON FARM: AN
EMPLOYER-FRIENDLY APPROACH TO THE
COMPENSABILITY OF DONNING AND DOFFING
ACTIVITIES UNDER THE “FLSA”
JACOB A. BRUNER*
ABSTRACT
No realm of employment litigation has been more active in recent years than
class action lawsuits under the FLSA. Although the FLSA was originally enacted to
help those who toiled in factories and on farms obtain a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s
work, it continues to haunt unwary employers nearly seventy years later. This Note
attempts to resolve those problems through the proposition of a single, uniform, and
employer-friendly standard for donning and doffing claims arising under the FLSA.
Specifically, this Note argues that courts should construe the “integral and
indispensable” test narrowly to protect employers from compensation claims for
relatively effortless activities while also exposing them to litigation for work that is
essential to completion of the principal activity, as contemplated by early labor
standard advocates. This ensures that legitimate claims for uncompensated work
time are fully covered by the FLSA and that frivolous suits fall by the wayside.
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I. INTRODUCTION

No realm of employment litigation has been more active in recent years than
class action lawsuits under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 1 Although the
FLSA was originally enacted in 1938 to “to help those who toil[ed] in factor[ies] and
on farm[s]” obtain “a fair days pay for a fair days work,” it continues to haunt
unwary employers nearly seventy years later. 2
Over the past decade, the number of FLSA lawsuits filed nationwide has
increased more than 300%, while the total amount of cases continues to rise each
year.3 Commentators have offered varying opinions to explain the growing trend of
litigation: increased employee awareness of the Act’s requirements, assertive
employees’ counsel’s widespread mining for plaintiffs, more sophisticated use of the
internet, increasingly transient workers with dwindling loyalties to a single
employer, the relative ease with which claims may be brought, and the potential for
large, aggregate damage awards.4 Most prominently, however, the outdated and
ambiguous language of the statute has resulted in significant gray areas that serve as
fertile breeding grounds for potential claims. 5
Following the economic decline of the 1920s, the FLSA was adopted to serve
two broad functions: (1) spread employment across the largest possible span of

1

See The Proliferation of FLSA Collective Actions, LAW360 (June 28, 2007),
http://www.law360.com/articles/28245/the-proliferation-of-flsa-collective-actions.
2

Id.; see also Message to Congress on Establishing Minimum Wages and Maximum
Hours, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15405 (last
visited July 15, 2015) (discussing the purpose of the FLSA at the time of enactment).
3

See A Developing and Simple Faragher Defense to FLSA Claims, CORP. COMPLIANCE
INSIGHTS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/kelly-kolb/ (citing Federal
Judicial Caseload and Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics (last visited November 17, 2016)).
4

See Douglas Darch et al., Compensable Time, PRACTICAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW
(West 2015) (providing an overview of common class action lawsuits under the FLSA based
on an employer’s failure to recognize and count certain hours worked as compensable).
5 See Number of New FLSA Lawsuits filed Each Continues to Rise, A.B.A. (Oct. 14,
2010), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/101410-rise-in-flsaemployment-and-labor.html.
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available workers, and (2) alleviate oppressive working conditions. 6 Congress
intended to accomplish these goals by placing a ceiling over the number of hours
worked, a floor under the amount of wages earned, and restrictions on most kinds of
child labor.7 Legislators anticipated that these measures would increase the number
of jobs and reduce high unemployment rates by limiting the hours each individual
employee could work before employers would be forced to pay them extra
compensation—an explicit financial disincentive to deter employers from forcing
workers to work excessive hours.8 Further, the enactment of minimum wage laws
and child labor restrictions would eliminate the prevalence of labor conditions
“detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and well-being of workers.”9 At the time of its enactment,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized the FLSA as “the most far reaching,
far-sighted program for the benefit of workers ever adopted in this or any other
country.”10
In the years since Roosevelt’s proclamation, however, the federal courts have
struggled to reach a consensus on activities that constitute compensable “work.”11
Generally, an entity is said to “employ” a person under the FLSA if it “suffers or
permits [a person] to work.” 12 Although the FLSA requires overtime pay for work
performed in excess of forty hours per week, it does not define the meaning of the
term “work.”13 While certain “preliminary” and “postliminary” activities have been
expressly excluded from compensability under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, the
federal courts have been tasked with filling in the gaps. 14 The broad meaning that has
emerged from Supreme Court cases describes “work” as an exertion or loss of
employees’ time that is (1) controlled or required by the employer, (2) pursued
necessarily and primarily for the employer’s benefit, and (3) if performed outside
scheduled work time, then such performances are an “integral and indispensable”
6 See FLSA: A Two-Minute History Issue No. 582, 2013 WL 420439 (West 2015)
(describing the primary purposes behind the Congressional enactment of the Fair Labor
Standards Act); see also FLSA: A Two-Minute History, CCH EMPLOYMENT LAW BRIEFING:
WHITE
COLLAR
EXEMPTION
REVISIONS
(April
21,
2004),
https://www.cch.com/press/news/2004/EmploymentLawBriefing.pdf.
7 See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, UNITED STATES HISTORY, http://www.u-shistory.com/pages/h1701.html (last visited July 15, 2015).
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Darch et al., supra note 4.

12

29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2015).

13

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2015); see also Jordan v. IBP, Inc. 542 F. Supp. 2d 790
(M.D Tenn. 2008) (citing Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 597 (1944) (“In determining whether [a certain activity] constitutes compensable work or
employment within the meaning of the [FLSA], we are not guided by any precise statutory
definition of work or employment.”)).
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2015); see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 41 (2005)
(noting that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not purport to change the Supreme Court’s earlier
descriptions of the term “work”).
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part of the employee’s principal activities. 15 Nowhere has this analysis been more
controversial than in the context of donning and doffing activities. 16
Donning and doffing—time spent putting on or taking off protective clothes and
gear—has been a major source of litigation in recent years. 17 Donning and doffing
cases generally involve the following sequence of events:
In a typical scenario, the employee commutes from his or her home to the employer’s
facility, and upon entering the facility, proceeds to a locker room. This time is termed
“pre-doffing” because it elapses before the donning of protective gear occurs. After
the employee dons the required protective gear, he or she typically walks to an
assigned work area. The time between the donning of protective gear and the start of
actual production tasks is termed “post-donning.” After completing production tasks
and completed his or her shift, the employee walks back to the locker room. The time
between the end of production tasks and the doffing of protective gear is termed “predoffing.” After the employee doffs (and perhaps washes protective gear), he or she
leaves the plant. This time is termed “post-doffing.”18

Unfortunately for employers, the outcome of these cases depends frequently on the
specific facts of the case and the presiding jurisdiction where the claim is filed. 19
Four separate tests have emerged in the various courts of appeal:
(1) The “unique versus non-unique gear” test;
(2) The “exertion” test;
(3) The “benefit to employer versus employee” test;
(4) Various hybrid models adopted in other jurisdictions. 20
Each method attempts to describe activities that are so “integral and indispensable”
to the employee’s principal activity that they are properly characterized as
compensable “work.”21
Consequently, employers have been left guessing whether certain tasks require
compensation and find themselves at risk for litigation. 22 This position poses a
number of significant problems. First, the costs and attorney’s fees associated with
defending against pending litigation are substantial. Second, frivolous claims present
challenges for employers because most are poorly versed in the nuances of wage and

15

Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2008).

16

Darch et al., supra note 4.

17

Id.

18

James Watts, Dressing for Work is Work: Compensating Employees Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act for Donning and Doffing Protective Gear, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
297 (2010) (evaluating the reasoning employed by the circuit courts of appeal to determine
whether employees must be compensated for the donning and doffing of protective gear).
19

Darch et al., supra note 4.

20

Id.

21

Watts, supra note 18.

22 The Proliferation of FLSA Collective Actions, supra note 1 (noting that employers have
been advised merely to review their practices to take account of the most commonly litigated
activities to help determine whether tasks should be compensated).
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hour laws.23 Third, many employers also endure significant measures to limit
exposure in the future and incur a number of non-financial burdens as well,
including high levels of stress, damaged reputations, and fewer resources available to
operate the business.24
This Note attempts to resolve those problems through the proposition of a single,
uniform, and employer-friendly standard for donning and doffing claims arising
under the FLSA. Specifically, this Note seeks to limit employers’ exposure to
litigation by narrowing the possible avenues through which employees can seek
compensation. In doing so, this Note recognizes the importance of shielding unwary
employers from liability against today’s onslaught of wage and hour claims.
Part II of this Note provides a lengthy background discussion of the history of the
FLSA. Part II.A begins with a discussion of the early years of the labor reform
movement to consider the Act’s purpose and origins. Part II.B supplements the
discussion in Part II.A through a study of the New Deal era to highlight the effects of
important Supreme Court cases on the development of the nation’s most prominent
wage and hour law.
Part III provides an overview of the statutory language, amendments, and case
law that guide claims for compensation under the FLSA to familiarize readers with a
number of interconnected legal doctrines that form the basis of donning and doffing
litigation.25
Part IV of this Note summarizes the current state of the law through a survey of
various donning and doffing tests that circuit courts have adopted around the country
before synthesizing their holdings in the context of this Note’s proposal.
Part V of this Note argues that courts should construe the “integral and
indispensable” test narrowly to provide the most amount of protection for modern
day employers. Part V.A identifies the circuit court tests that best effectuate this
proposal by considering employers’ potential exposure to litigation in each
jurisdiction. Part V.B then highlights the pragmatic concerns imposed by broader
tests in the context of a recent Supreme Court decision.
Part VI comments on potential criticism of this Note’s proposal in light of the
legislative history and purpose of the FLSA before outlining how the Second Circuit
has already incorporated these policy concerns into its employer-friendly standard.
Part VII of this Note offers a brief conclusion and shifts gears to discuss the
potential impact of the proposal on plaintiff-employees.

23

Id.

24

See generally Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section4.htm (last visited July 15, 2015).
25 Note that collective bargaining issues raised within the context of Section 203(o) are
outside the scope of this paper. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2015).
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II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF WAGE AND HOUR LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Early Labor Movements and the Progressive Era
“The History of the FLSA has included some big steps forward—and a few steps
back . . .” -Collete Irving, National Women’s Law Center26
For almost an entire century prior to passage of the FLSA in 1938, demand for
progressive labor reform grew as the country moved from an agrarian to an industrial
society.27 The life of a nineteenth-century American industrial worker was far from
easy: wages were low, hours were long, and factory conditions were poor. 28 Most of
the country’s financial resources were concentrated in the hands of capitalists while
a majority of workers, both skilled and unskilled, suffered the effects of periodic
market fluctuations, eroding wages, and high levels of unemployment. 29 To make
matters worse, large influxes of migrants empowered industry bosses by increasing
the supply of cheap labor, and technological advancements made unskilled workers
expendable.30 Predictably, early attempts for labor reform were unsuccessful. 31 Some
reformists were even indicted and prosecuted for criminal conspiracy as a result of
their reformist activities.32 In 1842, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put an
end to those prosecutions in Commonwealth v. Hunt.33 Hunt ultimately repudiated
the application of old English Common Law to post-Revolutionary America and
sparked the first sign of progress for the American labor movement. 34
In the wake of Hunt and other labor combination cases, thousands of workers
fled to join workers’ rights organizations in hopes of establishing stronger
coalitions.35 Through entities such as the American Federation of Labor and its
predecessor, the Knights of Labor, workers from all socioeconomic categories united
26 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Care Work is Real Work—And Must be
Compensated as Such, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (May 11, 2015),
http://www.nwlc.org/tags/fair-labor-standards-act-flsa.
27

See Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor Standards Act,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 2000), http://stats.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/12/art3full.pdf.
28 See
The
Struggle
of
Labor,
AMERICAN
HISTORY,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/history-1994/discontent-and-reform/the-struggle-oflabor.php (last visited July 15, 2015).
29

Id.

30

See
The
Early
Labor
Movement,
PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/the-early-labor-movement/ (last visited July
15, 2015).
31

The Struggle of Labor, supra note 28.

32

See DAVID TWORNEY, LABOR

AND

EMPLOYMENT LAW: TEXT & CASES § 2 (13th ed.

2007).
33

Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 111 (1842).

34

Hunt, 45 Mass. at 111 (“We can not perceive that it is criminal for men to agree
together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such as a manner as best to subserve
their own interests.”).
35

The Struggle of Labor, supra note 28.
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to embrace their desires for freedom from industrial order. 36 These efforts became
known as the “short hours movements.”37 Activists believed that shorter work hours
would usher in a new and progressive era of labor life in three ways: first, shorter
hours would protect the safety of workers by tempering worker fatigue and reducing
the prevalence of occupational injuries; second, shorter work hours would increase
personal welfare by reducing labor strife and allowing more time for home and
family life; third, shorter hours reflected a moral belief that measures ought to be
taken to counter the effects of harsh working conditions. 38 A number of significant
labor reforms followed in the wake of the “short hours movement:” federal ten-hour
workdays, Labor Day, two-day weekends, and more.39 States would eventually get
on board as well.40
By 1884, labor was no longer a “united force,” and Federations had differing
ideas about democracy, politics, legislation, immigration, and the inclusion of certain
minorities:
On the left were the socialists; the middle road was held by the Knights
[of Labor]; the right was shared by F.O.O.T.A.L.U [“Federation of
Organized Trades and Labor Unions”] and the independent trade unions.
There was disagreement over methods. Socialists were divided between
trade unionists, advocates of political action, and advocates of violence;
the Knights fostered the “one big union”; the trades were vacillating
between economic and legislative action . . . [The] socialists looked to
overthrow the capitalistic order; the Knights looked to the destruction of
the wage system and the eventual establishment of a cooperative
economic system which included both owners and laborers; the trade
were becoming more and more conscious of the magical quality of high
wages to solve all their troubles.41
As heated as the debates became within the Federations themselves, class
warfare between the working class and laissez-faire capitalists like John D.
Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie resulted in some of the most violent labor
conflicts in the nation’s brief history. 42 These conflicts played out on the national
stage through the railway strike of 1877, Haymarket Square riot of 1886, Homestead
strike of 1892, Pullman strike and boycott of 1892, anthracite strike of 1902,
garment workers’ uprisings of 1909-1911, and the steel strike of 1919.43
36

Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2001)
(examining the original rationales of maximum hours labor standards, reviewing empirical
research corroborating their continued relevance, and outlining proposed changes to the
FLSA).
37

Id. at 7-8.

38

Id. at 9.

39

Id. at 15.

40

Id.

41

JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR, 158-59 (1966).

42

The Struggle of Labor, supra note 28.

43

Miller, supra note 36.
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Meanwhile, the Federations faced even stronger opposition from the U.S.
Supreme Court.44 Over the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court managed to deal significant blows to the labor reform movement through a
wave of cases attacking the constitutionality of minimum wage laws, maximum hour
limits, and child labor provisions. 45
1. Hammer v. Dagenhart
Hammer v. Dagenhart, opined in 1918, is among the most noteworthy Supreme
Court cases decided.46 Roland Dagenhart, the litigant in the case, worked in a cotton
mill in Charlotte, North Carolina with his two minor sons, both of whom were barred
from employment at the mill under the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 (“Child Labor
Act”).47 The Child Labor Act, originally enacted pursuant to congressional
commerce power, prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of goods
produced at factories where children were employed beneath a certain age. 48
Dagenhart brought suit seeking an injunction that would bar the statute’s
enforcement.49 Dagenhart argued that the Act unconstitutionally exceeded the scope
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 50 Writing for the majority of the
Court, Justice William R. Day struck down the law, in a significant departure from
Supreme Court precedent that had permitted use of congressional policing power to
regulate the health, safety, morality and general welfare of individuals under the
Commerce Clause.51 The Court reasoned that Congress’s commerce power could
only be used to prohibit the interstate shipment of intrinsically harmful goods, like
lottery tickets or impure food, but not items that were harmless in and of themselves,
like the products of child labor.52
While Hammer proved to be a major victory for Mr. Dagenhart and family,
Justice Holmes’ famous dissent characterized his dissatisfaction with the decision as
follows:
If there is any matter upon which civilized countries have agreed—far
more unanimously than they have with regard to intoxicants and some
other matters over which this country is now emotionally aroused—it is
the evil of premature and excessive child labor. I should have thought that
if we were to introduce our own moral conceptions where it is my opinion
44

See Fair Labor Standards Act, supra note 7.

45

Id.

46

Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (prohibiting the transportation in
interstate commerce of manufactured goods produced in factories employing children under
the age of fourteen).
47

Id. at 268.

48

Id. at 269.

49

Id. at 268.

50

Id. at 269.

51

Id. at 276-77.

52 See Logan E. Sawyer III, Creating Hammer v. Dagenhart, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 67 (2012) (defending the Court’s use of federal policing power in its widely criticized
opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart).
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they do not belong, this was preeminently a cause for upholding the
exercise of all of its powers by the United States.53
Hammer was the first of many setbacks for the fair labor standards movement of
the time.
2. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital
Five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hammer, the judiciary sent
another crushing blow to labor reformists by striking down a District of Columbia
statute that would have established minimum wage laws for women. 54 The D.C. law
created a board to investigate, solicit input, and ultimately set minimum wages for
women and children to protect them from conditions detrimental to their health and
morals.55 When the board eventually set an agreed upon wage, a local hospital—well
known for employing women at wages below the recommended amount—decided to
sue the board.56 The hospital attacked the law as unconstitutional on grounds that it
violated the “liberty of contract” doctrine previously established in Lochner v. New
York.57
In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Sutherland, the Court agreed and held the law
to be an “arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract” because the statute
imposed uniform wages on all women regardless of need and prevented them from
obtaining results through private bargaining. 58 Despite years of progress, the Lochner
era appeared to reaffirm the “backward looking and politicized commitment to
laissez faire economics.”59
B. The Great Depression and the “New Deal”
“All but the hopelessly reactionary will agree that to conserve our primary
resources of man power, government must have some control over maximum hours,
minimum wages, the evil of child labor, and the exploitation of unorganized labor.”President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Establishing Minimum
Wages and Maximum Hours (May 24, 1937)60

53

Hammer, 247 U.S. at 280.

54

See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (invalidating
D.C.’s minimum wage law for women on Lochner era principles).
55

Id. at 539-42.

56

Id. at 542.

57

Id. at 545 (“The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it
authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the
guaranties of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); see also Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (upholding “liberty of contract” doctrine for employees in bakery
pursuant to the substantive component of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause).
58

Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545, 559; see also Alex McBride, Capitalism and Conflict,
PBS.ORG
(Dec.
2006),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/landmark_adkins.html.
59

See Sawyer III, supra note 52, at 68.

60

See Message to Congress, supra note 2.
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Reform came to a halt during the economic boom of the 1920s partly because of
the Supreme Court decisions discussed above and a growing desire for less
government regulation, which resulted in less need for activism. 61 Fortunately for
workers, labor organizations maintained “structures of reform” throughout the
decade that would form the foundation for change in the wake of the Great
Depression.62 On October 29, 1929, the stock market crashed, setting off a
worldwide decline in economic standards like nothing anyone had seen before. 63
By 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt had already jump-started the wheels of a “New
Deal” for American workers.64 Roosevelt promised to restore faith in American
industries through ardent labor reform and to enact emergency measures that would
counter the effects of high unemployment that the Depression created.65
Accordingly, Roosevelt nominated Frances Perkins as his Secretary of Labor and
instructed her to begin work under the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”). 66
The NIRA shared many of the same goals as labor federations: eight-hour
workdays, forty-hour workweeks, improved working conditions, etc. 67 But the NIRA
faced opposition from the Supreme Court as well. 68 On May 27, 1935, the Supreme
Court disarmed major provisions of the statute in the famous “sick chicken” case, A.
L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al. v. United States.69
1. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al. v. United States
Schechter involved a challenge to Section 3 of the NIRA, which empowered the
President to approve “codes of fair competition” for a number of trades, including
the poultry processing industry, and impose penalties for violations of the code in
any transaction affecting commerce.70 These codes regulated schedules of minimum
wages, prices, maximum work hours, collective bargaining, and other rules that
would be binding upon entire industries. 71 Schechter Poultry Corporation was
charged with having violated the poultry code by selling sick chickens to butchers in
61

See Miller, supra note 36, at 16.

62

Id. at 17.

63

See Charless Duhigg, Depression, You Say? Check Those Safety Nets, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
23,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/weekinreview/23duhigg.html?n=Top%2FReference%2F
Times%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FF%2FFinances.
64 See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a
Minimum Wage, DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/flsa1938.htm#3
(last visited July 15, 2015).
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.; see also Miller, supra note 36, at 18-19.

68

See Grossman, supra note 64.

69

A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating as
unconstitutional a provision of the NIRA that authorized the President to approve codes of fair
competition for the poultry processing industry).
70

Id. at 521-22.

71

Id. at 522.
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the northeast region of the country. 72 Thereafter, Schechter challenged the
constitutionality of the NIRA as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
commerce powers and a violation of separation of powers principles. 73 In an opinion
written by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court unanimously reversed the convictions
and held that, because the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of authority, the
Code enacted pursuant to that authority was void.74 Even if the Code was an
otherwise valid regulation, the Court noted that it could not be applied against the
defendants because they were engaged in strictly local activities with no direct effect
on interstate commerce:
Were these transactions ‘in’ interstate commerce? Much is made of the
fact that almost all the poultry coming to New York is sent there from
other states. But the code provisions, as here applied, do not concern the
transportation of the poultry from other states to New York, or the
transactions of the commission men or others to whom it is cosigned, or
the sales made by such cosignees to defendants. When defendants made
their purchases, whether at the West Washington Market in New York
City or at the railroad terminals serving the city, or elsewhere, the poultry
was trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition.
The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended.
Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter
and the local sale to retail dealers and butchers who in turn sold directs to
consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were
transactions in interstate commerce.75
Following major policy blows in Schechter and related state and federal labor cases,
President Roosevelt terminated the administration in charge of promulgating rules
under the NIRA and went back to the drawing board.76
Wage and hour legislation was a major campaign issue again in the 1936
presidential race between Roosevelt and Alf Landon, a Republican Governor from
the State of Kansas.77 To date, the 1936 faceoff is the most lopsided presidential
election victory in the history of the United States: Democratic incumbent Franklin
D. Roosevelt won a total of 583 electoral votes in comparison to the 8 Landon won. 78
Roosevelt interpreted the landslide victory as support for his New Deal platform. 79
72

Id. at 527.

73

Id. at 519.

74 Id. at 541-42; see generally Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The
Current of Commerce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105
(1992) (arguing that the Court’s “switch in time” was conceptually, stylistically, and
doctrinally congruent with the Court’s contemporary jurisprudence).
75

Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542-43.

76

See Miller, supra note 36, at 19-20.

77 See
On
This
Day,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0909.html.
78

See
1936
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION,
http://www.270towin.com/1936_Election/ (last visited July 15, 2015).
79

13,

1987),
270TOWIN,

See Grossman, supra note 64.
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Roosevelt was determined to overcome decades-long scrutiny by the Supreme
Court.80
In February 1937, Roosevelt struck back at the Justices through his CourtPacking Plan.81 The effect of the proposal would be to ultimately reduce the power
of each individual voter on the Court by saturating the bench with new members—a
concept the Justices would certainly disfavor:
Whenever a Judge or Justice of any Federal Court has reached the age of
seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity to retire on a
pension, a new member shall be appointed by the President then in office
[up to an additional maximum of six Justices], with the approval, as
required by the Constitution, of the Senate of the United States. 82
Before Roosevelt could act on his proposal, the Supreme Court reversed its
course in what has come to be known as the “switch in time that saved the nine.”83
The switch is an important turning point for American legal history—even more so
for fair labor standard advocates.84 West Coast Hotel followed suit.85
2. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
Less than a decade removed from the Lochner era, an era in which the Court
struck down minimum wage laws for women and invalidated efforts to improve
labor standards on a nationwide scale, a significant theoretical shift in the Supreme
Court occurred in 1937.86 In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a former hotel
chambermaid brought suit against a Washington-based hotel to recover $216.19 in
back wages stemming from state minimum wage violations. 87 On March 29, 1937,
the Court ruled in favor of Elsie Parrish with a liberal minority to uphold the validity
of the Washington law and provide the framework for enactment of the FLSA just
one year later.88
Following West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, labor advocates learned of an interesting
story. In 1933, when President Roosevelt asked Frances Perkins to become his
Secretary of Labor, she told him that she would accept if she could advocate a law
that would regulate wages, hours, and child labor—the three pillars of labor reform
that would later become the foundation of the FLSA. 89 When Roosevelt agreed,
80

Id.

81

Id.

82

See Fireside Chat: On “Court-Packing”,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3309.

MILLER CTR.

83

See Grossman, supra note 64.

84

Id.

85

See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

86

See Grossman, supra note 64.

87

West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 388.

88

Id. at 586; see also Grossman, supra note 64.

(Mar.

9,

1937),

89

Grossman, supra note 64. For an overview of the three main objectives of the FLSA,
see supra Section I.
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Perkins cautioned the President that “to launch such a program . . . might be
considered unconstitutional?”90 Roosevelt responded, “Well we can work out
something when the time comes.” 91 In the aftermath of Schechter and various
challenges to the NIRA, Secretary Perkins asked lawyers at the Department of Labor
to draw up a number of wage, hour, and child-labor bills that she hoped could
survive Judicial review.92 She then locked the bills in her desk drawer and informed
the President what she had done.93 One of the bills, known later to be the DavisBacon Act, proposed using the purchasing power of the Government contractors as
an instrument for improving labor standards in the construction industry. 94 Although
the bill proved successful at times before “the Switch,” the Act was later
supplemented with more progressive legislation in the form of the Public Contracts
Act of 1936 (“Walsh-Healey Act”).95 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
West Coast Hotel, “When he felt the time was ripe, [President Roosevelt] asked
[Secretary of Labor] Frances Perkins, ‘What happened to that nice unconstitutional
bill you tucked away?’”96
That bill—a general piece of legislation on fair labor standards—would
eventually turn into the FLSA. 97 After months of heated debate and substantial
compromise within both houses of Congress, FDR signed the bill into law on June
25, 1938.98 United States v. Darby later affirmed its constitutionality.99
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FLSA AND ITS PROGENY
The structure of the FLSA is nearly as complicated as its history. Several
interconnecting statutes and legal doctrines affect compensation requirements under
the FLSA.100 Aside from the language of the statute itself, these include a number of
amendments (such as the Portal-to-Portal Act), the “continuous workday rule,” and
various legal doctrines (including the “integral and indispensable” activity test,
“engaged to wait” test, and de minimis time doctrine) that attempt to define the outer
boundaries of compensable “work.” This Note considers each in turn below.
A. Scope of the FLSA
29 U.S.C. § 202 (“FLSA”) reads as follows:

90

Grossman, supra note 64.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding the validity of the FLSA
under congressional commerce power).
100

Watts, supra note 18, at 299.
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(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers
(1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce
to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the
workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of
goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in
commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes
with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. That Congress
Further finds that the employment of persons in domestic service in
households affects commerce;
(b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the exercise by
Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and
with foreign nations, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate
the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially
curtailing employment or earning power.101
The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) indicates in its guidance on the FLSA
that the statute “establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth
employment standards affecting employees in the private sector and Federal, State,
and local governments.”102 Generally speaking, the Act requires employers to pay
covered employees who are engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce at a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour—a figure that has steadily risen
since the enactment of the statute in the 1930s.103 The FLSA also requires employers
to pay at least time-and-a-half to covered employees who work more than forty
hours in a given workweek.104 Numerous exemptions and exceptions are provided as
to the payment of both minimum wages and overtime, most of which are beyond the
scope of this paper.105 Sections 11(c) and 12, respectively, require employers subject
to the FLSA to (1) maintain records in accordance with regulations promulgated by
the Wage and Hour Administrator and (2) prohibit the shipment or delivery of
commerce produced by oppressive child labor. 106 The FLSA provides a number of
remedies to aggrieved plaintiffs: criminal sanctions, private suits for the payment of

101

29 U.S.C. § 202 (2015).

102

See Compliance Assistance—Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), DEP’T
https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited July 15, 2015).

OF LABOR,

103 See The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. (July 4,
2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42713.pdf; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2015)
[hereinafter An Overview].
104

Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2016).

105

See Les A. Schneider & J. Larry Stine, Wage and Hour Law: Compliance and Practice,
1 WAGE & HOUR LAW 1 § 3 (2015).
106

Id.
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back wages, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and injunctive actions,
which the Wage and Hour Administrator can commence. 107
After more than seventy years, the FLSA remains the primary federal statute
setting the minimum wage and maximum hour standards applicable to most
American workers.108 Despite its impact on employment practices for over a halfcentury, many employers are still unclear on the language of the statute—and
rightfully so.109 Although the FLSA governs certain aspects of the employment
relationship, the statute fails to provide clearly defined limits on that relationship. 110
Section 203(d) defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to any employee.”111 Meanwhile, the term
“employee” is defined as “any individual employed by an employer” and an entity is
said to “employ” an individual under the FLSA if it “suffers or permits [him or her]
to work.”112
Pursuant to these basic guidelines, most FLSA litigation can be divided into three
categories:
(1) Misclassification
requirements;

of

employees

as

exempt

from

overtime

(2) Misclassification of employees as independent contractors not eligible
for overtime over minimum wage; and
(3) Failure to pay nonexempt employees for all hours worked.
This Note focuses strictly on the third category.113
B. The Portal-to-Portal Act and “Continuous Workday” Rule
Since 1938, the FLSA has been amended on multiple occasions, most
prominently in 1947 with the passing of the Portal-to-Portal Act.114 In the wake of
vague definitions, confusing DOL regulations, and judicial uncertainty, compliance
with the statute became increasingly complex in the years following its enactment. 115
Large employers and wealthy businessmen—many of whom shared ideals
reminiscent of tyrannical industry bosses—were fearful of potential
overcompensation of employees in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Anderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery, Co.116
107

Id.

108

See Miller, supra note 36, at 2-3.

109

See An Overview, supra note 103.

110

Id.

111

29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2015).

112

29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2015).

113

See Darch et al., supra note 4.

114

See Watts, supra note 18, at 4.

115

See Miller, supra note 36, at 23 (discussing how the FLSA passed by “legislative fiat”).

116

Anderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692-93 (1946) (holding that
preliminary work activities, where controlled by the employer and performed entirely for the
employer’s benefit, are properly included as working time under the FLSA).
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Anderson involved a group of employees who brought suit to recover lost wages
for time spent walking to and from clock-in stations at a large pottery plant.117 The
employees were required to enter the plant at a time station located in the northeast
corner of the grounds before working their way through the eight acres of factory
floor to the production area where they performed their work, including various
preliminary duties.118 Despite arriving nearly fourteen minutes prior to their clock-in
times and leaving nearly fourteen minutes after their clock-out times, workers were
paid for a straight eight hours of work—fifty-six minutes fewer per day than the
amount alleged in their complaint. 119 Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice
Murphy held that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for their activities
under the FLSA.120
Congress then swiftly and forcefully enacted 29 U.S.C. § 254 (the “Portal-toPortal Act”) in response to Anderson to repudiate claims for compensation stemming
from routine travel and other inherently preliminary or postliminary activities.121 The
Portal-to-Portal Act states, in part:
No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment on the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . on account of the failure . . . to pay an
employee minimum wages or to pay an employee overtime compensation,
for or on account of any of the following activities . . .
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of
performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is
employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal
activity or activities. . . .122
The DOL has promulgated one large exception to this rule through its
“continuous workday” rule, which generally requires compensation for all activities
taking place in “the period between the commencement and completion on the same
workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities . . . and includes all time
within that period whether or not the employee engages in work throughout all of
that period.”123
Understandably, federal courts have struggled to adopt a uniform test to wean out
those activities that are between the beginning and end of the employee’s principal
activities, yet not of such preliminary or postliminary nature as to fall within the

117

Id. at 682-83.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 682-84.

120

Id. at 694.

121

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005) (finding that time spent walking to
production area after donning protective gear was covered by the FLSA).
122

29 U.S.C. § 254 (2015).

123

29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b) (2015).
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Portal-to-Portal Act exceptions.124 Courts, however, have identified a number of
legal doctrines to help narrow down compensable activities under the FLSA:
(1) the integral and indispensable activity test;
(2) the engaged to wait versus waiting to be engaged test;
(3) the de minimis time doctrine.125
C. “Integral and Indispensable”
Activities performed before or after the principal activity which are “integral and
indispensable” to that activity are compensable under the FLSA. 126 The element of
“integrality” primarily “turns on whether, in relation to the principal activity, a task
is essential to completeness, organically joined, or linked or composed of constituent
parts making a whole.”127 A number of cases illustrate, however, that certain
activities which are “necessary” in the sense that they are required by law or the
employer may not be “essential to completeness” if they are the modern paradigms
of preliminary and postliminary activities. 128 In that sense, “integral” and
“indispensable” are not necessarily synonymous.
D. Engaged to Wait Versus Waiting to Engage
Time spent “engaged to wait” is also compensable, while time spent “wait[ing] to
be engaged” is not.129 The critical issue, initially set forth in Skidmore v. Swift and
now codified by statute, is whether “the employee is unable to use the [on-call] time
effectively for his own purposes.”130 Key factors for determining the compensability
of certain activities include: (1) whether the employee is required to remain on the
employer’s premises, (2) the frequency of calls, (3) whether an employee can
conduct personal activities while on call, and (4) the frequency of interruption from

124

See Darch et al., supra note 4; see also infra Section V.B (regarding Integrity
Solutions’ success in “squeezing into this gap”).
125

See Darch et al., supra note 4.

126

Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1956); see also Gorman v. Consol. Edison
Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 592 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that integrality turns on whether, in relation
to the principal activity, a task is “essential to completeness, organically joined or linked or
composed of constituent parts making a whole”).
127 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 592. Note also that some courts have phrased the issue differently
by focusing on whether the tasks are the sort of relatively non-physical and effortless
movements anticipated by the Portal-to-Portal Act.
128

See, e.g., Steiner, 350 U.S. 227; Gorman, 488 F.3d 586.

129

29 C.F.R. § 785.14 (2015) (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (finding that
an administrative agency’s interpretative rules deserve deference according to their
persuasiveness)).
130

29 C.F.R. § 785.15 (2015).
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work calls.131 Generally speaking, however, the compensability for waiting time
depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case.132
E. De Minimis Time Doctrine
The de minimis time doctrine prevents an employee from recovering for
otherwise compensable labor when the matter at issue concerns only a few minutes
of work beyond regularly scheduled hours and the employee is not required to exert
a substantial amount of time and effort.133 In Brock v. City of Cincinnati and related
cases in other circuits, courts have articulated three factors for consideration under
the de minimis test: “(1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording the
additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether the
claimants performed the work on a regular basis.” 134 To apply the factors properly, a
court must strike “a balance between requiring an employer to pay for activities it
requires of its employees and the need to avoid split-second absurdities that are not
justified by the actuality of the working conditions.” 135
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Keeping in mind the complicated and often convoluted legal doctrines that make
up the FLSA, the critical issue is as follows: whether donning and doffing activities
are so “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s principal activity in a given
workday that they constitute compensable “work.”
A. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.: “Unique Versus Non-Unique Gear” Test
The “unique versus non-unique gear” test is best illustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.136 By and large, the Alvarez line of cases indicates
that, for employers in the Ninth and Third Circuits, compensation should be paid
when employees spend time donning and doffing industry-specific gear and
clothing.137
In Alvarez, employees of a meat production plant brought a class action lawsuit
against their employer under the FLSA and related state provisions, alleging that the
employer was required to compensate them for time it took to change into required
and specialized protective clothing and gear.138 IBP, Inc., the meat packing empire of
131

See WAGE AND HOUR DIV., DEP’T. OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #22: HOURS WORKED UNDER
FAIR
LABOR
STANDARDS
ACT
(FLSA)
(2008),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs22.pdf.
THE

132

See 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 (2011).

133

Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 804 (6th Cir. 2001).

134

Id.; see also Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 373 (4th Cir. 2011)
(addressing whether the employees’ acts in donning and doffing protective gear were “integral
and indispensable” to the principal purpose of poultry processing or fell within the three-factor
de minimis test).
135 Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lindow v.
US, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).

137

See Darch et al., supra note 4.

138

See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 897.
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the American West, employed a complicated, yet efficient, production process
through which animals were slaughtered, moved along a series of chains into the
slaughter division, stored in an overnight cooling facility, transported to the
processing assembly line, and eventually cut, trimmed, divided, and packaged.139 To
ensure that plant production ran on time, employees were required to be at their
respective workstations by the time meat reached their position along the line. 140
Employees were required to complete a number of preliminary tasks prior to the start
of their shifts and had to arrive early to “gather their assigned equipment, don . . .
equipment in one of the . . . [plant’s] four locker rooms, and prepare work-related
tools before venturing to the slaughter or processing floors.” 141 At the end of every
shift, employees were required to complete many of these same tasks in reverse and
“clean, restore, and replace their tools and equipment.” 142 Further, employees were
only permitted to exit the processing and slaughter floors mid-shift after removing
their outer garments, protective gear, gloves, scabbards, and chains. 143
Once shifts began, plant employees’ time was strictly regulated and monitored—
rest and meal-break times began as soon as the last piece of meat passed through the
production line.144 Accordingly, IBP paid its plant employees according to a “gang
time pay” model, based solely on the times during which employees were actually
working on the production line (“line time”). 145 Notably, this excluded any of the
required time spent conducting pre-donning or post-doffing activities.146 Based on
these practices, a number of employees filed suit to recover back-wages for (1) preshift donning of protective gear and the preparation of work-related tools, (2) time
spent donning and doffing protective gear during the thirty minute unpaid mealbreak, and (3) post-shift doffing of protection gear, cleaning, and storing of the gear
and tools.147
The Ninth Circuit, holding in favor of the Pasco plant employees in part, noted
first that “because donning and doffing of this gear on the Pasco plant’s premises is
required by law, by rules of [IBP], [and] by the nature of the work” the donning and
doffing is “necessary” to the principal work performed and, therefore, “integral and
indispensable” to the principal activities taking place on the production line. 148
Second, the court found that “it is beyond cavil that the donning, doffing, washing,
and retrieving of protective gear is, at both broad and basic levels, done for the
benefit of IBP” because without them the potential for contamination would

139

Id. at 898.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Id. at 899.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 899-900.

146

Id. at 900.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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inevitably impede IBP’s disassembly process. 149 Finally, and most importantly for
the purposes of this Note, Alvarez stated as follows:
This “integral and indispensable” conclusion extends to donning, doffing,
and cleaning of non-unique gear (e.g. hardhats) and unique gear (e.g.
Kevlar gloves) alike. Little time may be required to don safety glasses and
the use of safety goggles is undoubtedly pervasive in industrial work. But
ease of donning and ubiquity of use do not make the donning of such
equipment any less “integral and indispensable” as that term is defined in
Steiner.150
Although the Ninth Circuit interpreted the “integral and indispensable” test broadly
enough to apply to both “unique and non-unique gear,” it ultimately excluded time
spent donning and doffing the non-unique gear as de minimis. The court noted that
“time spent donning and doffing non-unique protective gear, ‘although essential to
the job[] and required by the employer[,]’ is at once so insubstantial and so difficult
to monitor that it is de minimis as a matter of law.”151 The Supreme Court later
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and limited it to the specific facts of that
case.152 The Third Circuit has since followed suit in De Ascencio v. Tyson Foods,
Inc.153
B. Reich v. IBP, Inc.: “Exertion” Test
While the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the exertion test in its Alvarez
decision, courts in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits have continued to support its
usage.154 In both Circuits, employers must generally compensate employees for tasks
that require physical or mental effort beyond an ordinary degree of concentration. 155
In Reich v. IBP, Inc., the Secretary of Labor brought an action against the famous
meat packing company to enforce overtime and record-keeping provisions of the
FLSA.156 There, company employees were required to wear certain garments and
safety equipment for protection during the plant’s regular hours of production. 157
Workers were paid in accordance with “line time” and were divided into two distinct
149

Id.

150 Id. Note that this language explicitly rejects the exertion test considered infra Section
IV.B. See also De Ascencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding jury
instructions impermissibly directed jury to consider whether employees demonstrated
sufficient exertion in deciding whether their activities were compensable under the FLSA).
151

See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904 (quoting Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir.
1994)); see also Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d at 1061 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that seven
to eight minutes spent by employees reading log book and exchanging information, even if not
preliminary, was de minimis, and therefore not compensable).
152

See IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. 21, 41 (2005).

153

See De Ascencio, 500 F.3d at 372.

154

See Darch et al., supra note 4.

155

Id.

156

See Reich, 38 F.3d at 1124.

157

Id.
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categories: those who used knives in their duties and those who did not. 158 Knifewielding workers were required to wear specialized safety equipment and protective
gear consisting of “a mesh apron, a plastic belly guard, mesh sleeves or plastic arm
guards, wrist wraps, mesh gloves, rubber gloves, ‘polar sleeves,’ rubber boots, a
chain belt, a weight belt, a scabbard, and shin guards,” while non-knife wielding
workers wore hard hats, earplugs, safety footwear, safety eyewear, and clean, white,
and outer-garments required of all employees. 159
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that IBP failed to compensate its knifewielding workers for time spent “taking off, cleaning and storing the specialized
safety equipment.”160 Ruling in favor of the employees in part, the court ultimately
reached the same conclusion as Alvarez, but did so for a different reason. 161 The
Tenth Circuit held that compensation was owed for tasks requiring “physical or
mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer” 162 Thus, the
goggles and hard hats that the non-knife wielding employees donned and doffed did
not require compensation because they required very little concentration. 163
Alternatively, the court found that compensation was owed to the knife-wielding
employees because the donning and doffing of specialized gear required “physical
exertion, time, and a modicum of concentration to put [it] on securely and properly”
and was different “in kind, not simply degree, from the mere act of dressing.” 164
C. Perez v. Mountainaire Farms, Inc.: “Benefit to Employee Versus Employer” Test
The Fourth Circuit has adopted its own test for compensation claims under the
FLSA.165 The Fourth Circuit instructs employers to evaluate the purpose for which
the equipment is worn and whom the equipment benefits most. 166 This test is best
illustrated in Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc.167
In Perez, a group of uncompensated poultry processing employees filed suit
against their employer, Mountaire, for time spent donning and doffing personal
protective equipment.168 Mountaire managed the operation of its business much like
IBP: employees were instructed to begin work on the production line when the first
chickens arrived, end work when the last chicken left, and complete a number of
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preparatory activities.169 Employees were then compensated based strictly on “line
time,” which excluded their preliminary and postliminary work. 170
To calculate the amount of compensable time, the court applied Steiner’s
“integral and indispensable” test to the donning and doffing activities at issue. Perez
then concluded that because the preparatory activities “primarily benefit Mountaire
by ‘protecting the products from contamination, help[ing] keep workers’
compensation payments down, keep[ing] missed time to a minimum, and shield[ing]
the company from pain and suffering payments,’” they were “integral and
indispensable” to the plant’s operation and required compensation.171 Notably, Perez
did not distinguish between activities that involved either “specialized” gear or
absorbent amounts of exertion. Thus, the employees were able to recover for the
entire amount of uncompensated work. 172
D. Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp.: Hybrid Test
Some jurisdictions have tried to combine elements of both the “unique gear” and
“exertion” tests. For instance, in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., a case from
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, workers at a nuclear power plant facility filed
suit against their employer to recover wages for time spent passing through security
screening and donning and doffing non-unique protective gear, including metal
capped safety boots, safety glasses, and a helmet. 173 Although it was undisputed that
employees were paid for donning and doffing specialized protective gear required
within the nuclear containment area, the court had to determine whether
compensation was also required for the more basic equipment and preliminary
waiting time.174
To make this determination, the court considered elements of both Alvarez and
Reich. The court found that “indispensable” meant “necessary” and integral meant
“essential to completeness” or “organically joined or linked.” 175 Accordingly,
workers’ helmets, safety glasses, and metal-capped safety boots were
“indispensable” [necessary] but not “integral” [essential to completeness] to their
activities (even though such equipment was required by government regulation). 176
The court recognized that it was not following the Ninth Circuit’s Alvarez decision,
citing it for the proposition that “donning and doffing of non-unique gear (e.g. hard
hats) [is] [both] ‘integral and indispensable” as that term is defined in Steiner.177 The
panel concluded, “donning and doffing of a helmet, safety glasses and boots are
‘relatively effortless,’” evoking the Reich test of exertion or concentration required
169
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to complete a task.178 Thus, employers need not compensate workers for donning and
doffing non-unique gear.179
The Second Circuit’s reasoning, though different in form, is theoretically similar
in substance to many of the tests discussed above—in at least two of the those
instances, Alvarez and Reich, employees were limited to some extent by what they
could recover.180 The same story holds true in Gorman: employees could not recover
for time spent donning and doffing non-specialized gear. Employers in the Second
Circuit would be well-advised to consider the specific facts of each case and ask two
separate questions: (1) does the claim involve time spent donning and doffing
specialized gear?—and if so, (2) does the activity require physical or mental
exertion?181 If the answer is yes to both, then employers should compensate
employees for their time.
V. THE FLSA SHOULD BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY TO CURB LITIGATION AGAINST
EMPLOYERS
A. The Narrow Tests: Alvarez, Reich, and Gorman
Alvarez, Reich, and Gorman exemplify attempts to narrow the scope of
compensable activities under the FLSA to exclude the sorts of preliminary and
postliminary activities anticipated by the Portal-to-Portal Act. While Alvarez
interprets those activities to be “integral and indispensable” to the principal activities
on the production line, it excludes them from compensation under the de minimis
time doctrine.182 In doing so, it accomplishes the same policy goals by limiting
employer liability—albeit through a more back channel approach.183 Gorman, on the
other hand, interprets the activities at issue to be “indispensable” (necessary) but not
“integral” (essential) to the principal activities on the production line and excludes
them from compensation accordingly based on the lack of required exertion.184 Reich
takes it one step further. Under Reich, the preliminary and postliminary activities at
issue are neither “integral nor indispensable” because they can be accomplished with
“less than a modicum of concentration.”185
In each approach, it could be said that employees “won” their case in the sense
that they recovered large amounts of money for donning and doffing specialized
gear. Employers, however, should be content with the approach the Circuit Courts
have taken in limiting compensation for time spent working with non-specialized
gear. Further, because these legal doctrines expand beyond the facts of each case, the
prevailing message behind the narrower cases is that employees bear the burden of
proving something beyond “suffering” to recover compensation.
178
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1. The Burden of Proving Compensable Work
Under Alvarez, the burden is weak. Because Alvarez concedes that preliminary
donning and doffing activities are “integral and indispensable” to the principal
activities of a production line, employees seeking to recover lost compensation need
only prove that their activities fall outside the scope of the de minimis time
doctrine.186 As discussed above, work is de minimis when the matter at issue
concerns only a few minutes of work beyond regularly scheduled hours and the
employee is not required to exert a substantial amount of time and effort. 187 From a
practical perspective, however, courts have struggled to set a threshold for the de
minimis doctrine, which has made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to apply
a consistent standard.188 For instance, the de minimis exception may bar
compensation for several activities when viewed separately, but may permit those
same activities if the activities are aggregated together. 189 This incoherent threshold
provides greater flexibility to employees in crafting plausible scenarios through
which they then convince jurors and judges that time spent conducting an activity
was compensable. Because donning and doffing activities are recognized as “integral
and indispensable” to the principal activity, 190 employers could hypothetically face
liability for just about anything once the de minimis doctrine is removed as an
obstacle. So, while Alvarez has the potential to shield employers from liability in
certain situations, it is not their best bet.
Under Reich, employers are well protected from mass litigation claims stemming
from the most preliminary (or postliminary) of tasks, such as walking, cleaning,
clocking-in or out, and anything else requiring less than a modicum of
concentration.191 Although Reich does not shield employers from liability for more
specialized tasks tied to the employee’s principal activity, the fact is that most
employers are probably willing, if not happy, to adequately compensate employees
for doing their job.192 For all remaining activities, employees bear the brunt of the
burden to show that they exerted some sort of physical or mental exertion beyond
ordinary expectation.193 Of the three cases discussed in this section, Reich’s
“exertion test” provides the most amount of security for unwary employers.
Gorman presents an interesting curveball for employers because it protects them
from compensation claims stemming from “relatively effortless” activities while also
186
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exposing them to litigation for work that is integral to completion of the principal
activity.194 While activities such as walking may be too effortless to require
compensation, activities that occur just seconds prior to or after the principal activity
itself—and which are required in order to complete that activity—must be
compensated.195 For instance, Alvarez required employees to “gather their assigned
equipment . . . [and] prepare work-related tools before venturing to the slaughter or
processing floors.”196 Further, employees were required to “clean, restore, and
replace their tools and equipment” at the end of each shift.197 These are the sorts of
activities that employers could be liable for under Gorman. In sum, the case presents
a strong compromise among the “narrow” jurisdictions while still addressing the
needs of employers in minimizing litigation risks.
Factual differences alone cannot explain the logic behind these conflicting
methods as the majority of cases present very similar circumstances. 198 The reality is
simply that the “true cause of the split is in the law itself—the circuit courts simply
disagree on the proper test for determining when [and how] employees must be
compensated.”199 But these decisions reflect more than a scholarly pursuit of legal
academia: they have real consequences for real people.200 A test is only useful if it
can be applied practically and consistently to resolve disputes. 201 Consistency with
prior precedent establishes predictability in the law; consistency with the underlying
rational of the FLSA supports public policy objectives; and consistency in
application among various courts enhances the perception of fairness in our legal
system.202 In light the discussion in Part I,203 the reality is that claims for
compensation have spiraled out of control, and employers are more vulnerable now
than ever. Courts should bear this trend in mind as they struggle to find the proper
framework for assessing the validity of donning and doffing claims under the FLSA.
A. The Broad Test: Perez
So far, this Note has withheld detailed discussion of the “benefit to employer
versus employee” test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Perez. The Perez test focuses
primarily on whether the activity in question benefits the employee, through
protection from workplace hazards, or the employer, by protecting the product. 204
Much like the narrow Alvarez test, the Perez line of cases illustrates the same
troubling trend this Note has attempted to resolve: potential overexposure of
194
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employers to trigger-happy plaintiffs. Aside from the obvious problems this Note has
already addressed in Part I, two additional concerns merit further discussion.
1. Perez Represents a Departure from the “Integral and Indispensable” Standard
First, the benefits test represents a significant departure from the legal analysis
that is overwhelmingly employed in the context of donning and doffing litigation.
Accordingly, it should be cast aside. As set forth above, most circuit courts attempt
to define compensable “work” by considering whether or not the activity is “integral
and indispensable” to the employee’s principal job duties. 205 Admittedly, this is not
the only way to approach the issue. Recall that the “integral and indispensable” test
is one of many factors examined by a line of Supreme Court cases attempting to
define the term “work” under the FLSA.206 The Perez test represents an attempt to
emphasize the remaining factors: whether an activity is “controlled or required by
the employer” and/or “pursued necessarily and primarily for the employer’s
benefit.”207 While the approach is not wrong as a matter of law, it is improper in the
context of donning and doffing activities because such activities take place outside of
scheduled work time. Accordingly, Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc. reiterates that the
“integral and indispensable” test should govern:
The broad meaning that has emerged from Supreme Court cases describes
“work” as an exertion or loss of employees time that is (1) controlled or
required by the employer, (2) pursued necessarily and primarily for the
employer’s benefit, and (3) if performed outside scheduled work time, an
“integral and indispensable” part of the employee’s principal activities.208
1. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk: An Emerging Trend
Second, the Supreme Court recently addressed the matter further in Integrity
Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk.209 Integrity involved a pair of hourly employees who
retrieved products from warehouse shelves and packaged those products for delivery
to Amazon customers.210 At the end of each shift, the warehouse workers were
required to undergo security screenings before leaving the warehouses—this
required them to remove wallets, keys, belts, and pass through a metal detector—a
process that took roughly twenty-five minutes each day.211 When plaintiffs were
uncompensated for time spent waiting in line, they brought suit against Integrity,
arguing that the screens were done to prevent employee theft for the sole benefit of
the employer and its customers.212 The Supreme Court ruled that “preliminary and
205
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postliminary activities done at the employer’s request or for the employer’s benefit”
do not necessarily result in compensable time. 213 Instead, the Court “narrowed the
definition of ‘integral and indispensable’ to cover only those activities that are an
‘intrinsic element’ of an employee’s principal activities.” 214 The Court further
clarified that an activity is “integral and indispensable” to a worker’s principal duties
if it is “one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal
activities.”215 Interestingly, the language supported by the Supreme Court in Integrity
is essentially identical to the Gorman test, yet written in inverse form—Gorman
exposes employers to litigation for work that is integral to completion of the
principal activity. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas held that “[t]he screenings
were not an intrinsic element of retrieving products from warehouse shelves or
packing them for shipment[,]”—and therefore were not “integral or indispensable” to
the employees’ principal activities, because products could be retrieved and
packaged without security screening.216
Integrity’s conclusion is important for three reasons. First, Integrity’s rejection of
a broad brush to the “integral and indispensable” test falls in line with this Note’s
proposal for a more narrow interpretation. Integrity makes clear that, “[i]f the test
could be satisfied merely by the fact that an employer required an activity . . . it
would sweep into ‘principal activities’ the very activities that the Portal-to-Portal Act
was designed to address.”217 Second, Integrity explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
approach in Alvarez and implicitly backed the holding of Gorman. In addition to
unraveling Alvarez’s “broad brush” approach, Integrity noted that even if the
activities had been de minimis, as they were in Alvarez, “[t]he fact that an employer
could conceivably reduce the time spent by employees on any preliminary or
postliminary activity does not change the nature of the activity or its relationship to
the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform.” 218 Third, and most
important, the Court’s partial resolution of the “integral and indispensable” issue
provides much needed guidance to circuit courts and employers regarding pre- and
post-shift tasks tied to donning and doffing activities. 219 For the foregoing reasons,
the “benefits” test is best understood as an outlier and one that is not to be used in
the modern era of donning and doffing claims.
VI. PROPOSAL: THE SECOND CIRCUIT COMPROMISE
Although this Note has primarily focused its efforts on advocating on behalf of
employers, certain theoretical realities exist with regard to the FLSA in the sense that
it was primarily adopted for the benefit of workers. Accordingly, any reasonable
213
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proposal must also take into account the FLSA’s primary aim to effectuate higher
wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions for all employees covered under
the Act.
The Reich test offers the most amount of protection to employers. But it also
provides the most amount of harm to employees by robbing them of the fruits of
their “suffering.” Conversely, the Alvarez and Perez tests ensure that employees
receive wages for minute and preliminary tasks, but do so at great expense to their
employers. The Second Circuit’s approach in Gorman appears most suited for
adoption by the Supreme Court from both a pragmatic and policy perspective. By
protecting employers from compensation claims for “relatively effortless” activities
while also exposing them to litigation for work that is essential to completion of the
principal activity, Gorman squeezes into the gap created by the ambiguous language
of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal amendments.220 In doing so, Gorman ensures
two very important outcomes: legitimate claims for uncompensated “work” time are
fully covered by the FLSA and frivolous suits fall by the wayside.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note was inspired by the modern day, wage and hour litigation epidemic
that continues to clog the federal courts. Parts I through V examined this epidemic in
the context of employer liability as it relates to claims for uncompensated “work”
time resulting from donning and doffing activities. This Note concluded that “work”
should be construed more narrowly under the FLSA to reduce employers’ risks of
exposure to litigation in the future. It then ended with a brief discussion pinpointing
an ideal standard that accomplished this goal without undermining the broader
purposes of the Act.
Interestingly, this Note’s proposal provides important benefits to employees as
well. When employers are caught up in litigation and fewer resources are available
to invest in the business, employees are left with stagnating wages, poorer working
conditions, and unhappy bosses. Further, employees engaged in litigation against
their employer are generally unable or unwilling to return to their respective
positions and face certain career challenges. The reality is that legal ambiguity
imposes difficulties on all parties involved. The end result is cyclical: because parties
cannot adequately predict the outcomes of cases, they refuse to settle, and both are
left significantly worse off than they would have been if the laws were clear. So, the
frenzy of litigation continues.
Adoption of a single, uniform standard of “work” in the context of donning and
doffing litigation would go a long way toward eliminating that frenzy and ensuring
that the FLSA is restored to prominence as a tool for the prosperity of both
employers and employees. The Second Circuit’s Gorman test would be a good place
to start.
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